NO MORE NANOTECHNOLOGY IN "COVID-19"

WEAPONIZED NANOTECH IS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

THE USE OF WEAPONIZED NANOTECHNOLOGY IS A CALCULATED CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

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REGULATING WEAPONIZED NANOTECHNOLOGY:

HOW THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT OFFERS A WAY FORWARD

“Aggression is a “leadership” crime, and charges can be brought not only against actual political leaders, but also those in a position to induce or influence significant policy changes within a state.

It is therefore more likely that influential scientists and technicians could be held to account for their influence in the development of nanoweapons

private developers of military nanotechnology

the Nuremburg prosecutions included actions against those who financed the Nazi regime on the theory that their actions had enabled the atrocities that followed.”

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=gjicl

The International Criminal Court (ICC) already has procedures for addressing the sorts of crimes that these technologies could enable. Rather than developing a new framework and yet another regulatory body to govern the technology, the ICC could fold nanotechnology crimes into the existing provisions of the Rome Statute. Specifically, the crime of aggression should contain language that addresses nanotechnology.

These provisions should be capable of addressing both state-sanctioned military development and individual deployment of this weapon technology.

The adoption of such provisions would speak to a global consensus that the international community will not tolerate the misuse of nanotechnology.

Nanotechnology can be approached “top-down” or “bottom-up.” In a top-down approach, scientists seek to whittle down at a macro-sized structure until all that is left is an atomic arrangement. In the bottom-up approach, however, scientists actually create conditions that induce atoms to form desired structures of their own volition. Carbon nanotubes provide an example of such a bottom-up process. Scientists fire lasers at a graphite pellet, releasing an intense stream of atoms. They subject this stream to an array of hot and cold gases calculated to induce the atoms into hexagonal shapes; the resulting “tubes” are exceptionally strong and light.

Weaponization and Potential Drawbacks

For all the potential benefits of nanotech, its power presents significant risks. Hitoshi Nasu and Robert Pinson have pointed out the potentially catastrophic damage that nanotechnology could do if negligently mismanaged or intentionally weaponized. The lack of an international regulatory structure compounds the risk of an unintentional catastrophe. Furthermore, no defined framework exists for punishing either state or individual actors who intentionally misuse nanotech. The lack of a coherent strategy for punishment will present increasing problems as scientific advances increase nanotech’s potential abilities.

Biological Effects of Weaponization

The effects of a weapon engineered using actual nanotechnology could be catastrophic.

…Even carbon nanotubes, which are designed for inherently peaceful, industrial purposes, are biologically devastating. Studies have shown that they become lodged in the lungs and are nearly impossible for the body to break down because of their unique structure and tiny size.

The particles can eventually cause suffocation.

A device that forces shrapnel into the skin, like the Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) device [developed and deployed by the Israeli army], would not be necessary to effectively weaponize nanoparticles because these particles can be inhaled. Once they enter the bloodstream, they are theoretically capable of directly infiltrating the brain. The nanoparticles can use body systems and pathways that typical biological pathogens cannot.

For example, nanoparticles can travel along the olfactory nerves after inhalation.

Even if they are kept out of the bloodstream, they may still be capable of infiltrating the brain.

The ease with which nanoparticles can enter the body, the bloodstream, and the brain is made worse by the difficulties encountered in treating their effects.

Nanoparticles trigger oxidative stress, and “cationic [nanoparticles] have an immediate toxic effect at the blood-brain barrier.”

These immediate and severe consequences are difficult to diagnose in time to counteract their effects. Nanomaterials can be “more chemically reactive” than normal particles. They have a higher ratio of surface area to total area because of their small size and the precise structures to which they are engineered. Nanoparticles actually are so small that their movements and interactions with surrounding particles are partially governed by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are inherently unpredictable.

A necessary first step for managing a public health crisis is making an accurate identification of the toxin, pathogen, or other catalyst causing the crisis.

However, without advance knowledge of the specific nanoparticle in question, the “immediate toxic effect” that Matsuda and Hunt describe could devastate a community before officials could react.

If malevolent actors deploy nano-weapons, the current public health response plan would not be sufficient to combat the crisis.

Experts in the emergency response field are expressing these concerns about modern nanoparticles such as carbon nanotubes.

The implications for intentional weaponization of these particles are stark, given their unpredictability. A DIME-like shrapnel device incorporating nanoparticles instead of microparticles and intentionally distributing different kinds of nanoparticles with different chemical reactions could present a public health nightmare.

Difficulty of Controlling Self-replicating Devices

Replicator nano-robots are the next logical step after assembler nanorobots.

The basic theory of replicators is that the nano-robots could not only be trained to follow orders in the process of creating new nano-robots like assemblers, but also could actually automatically generate more and more copies of themselves. These replicator nanorobots would theoretically be able to reproduce at a geometric rate.

The weaponization of replicator robots is a frightening thought. Because existing nanoparticles already carry formidable biological effects, the cascade effect of replicators that can manipulate nanotech is deeply troubling.

State or Individual? How to Punish Dissimilar Actors for Deployment of Weaponized Nanotechnology

The current dispersal of nanotechnology raises further difficulties in preventing weaponization: (1) the threat of a non-state actor weaponizing the technology, and (2) the uncertainty of prosecuting an individual who is either state-affiliated or legitimately operating as a rogue agent.

Not only are militaries researching the applications of nanotechnology to warfare, but some of this work is outsourced to universities and companies.

For example, the United States military is working with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to determine applications of nanotechnology across a spectrum of uses in warfare. Universities are not the only private entities that already have access to advanced nanotechnology. Corporations and individuals account for over 75% of United States medical nanotechnology patents. The numbers are similar in other major areas of patent grants. Nanotechnology is therefore progressively owned by a more wide-ranging group of people.

The increasing private ownership of the technology creates further avenues through which a malevolent actor could gain control of nanoscience and weaponize it—

if more corporations, scientists, and universities

have the technical schematics and equipment necessary to create nanoparticles, the pace of its proliferation will likely increase.

INEFFECTIVE ALTERNATE MEANS OF REGULATION OR DETERRENCE Current nanotechnology regulation leaves much to be desired.

It is highly questionable whether existing regulations could prevent rogue leaders, states, or other groups from deploying either nanoparticles or nano-robots in an intentionally destructive manner.

Such regimes might incentivize responsible development of nanotechnology among corporate or research-based actors, because some regulatory frameworks on the national level do provide for penalties for malfeasance.

However, if the concern is malfeasance by a nation, or an actor with enough influence on a national level to enjoy de facto control, then regulations on the national level would prove ineffective.

What international guidelines that do exist are exactly that—guidelines. These guidelines offer prescriptive goals for what an ideal future of nanotechnology would look like. However, they do not have the regulatory muscle or the threat of real sanctions so they do not truly shape the evolution of the technology or convince actors to alter their behavior in its deployment.

Many novel nanoparticles are not defined as “new chemicals,” and so the existing chemical regulations tasked with controlling them do not govern them nor have any jurisdiction over their deployment. Nations seem unwilling to acknowledge the severe deficiencies in their regulatory frameworks. For example, the United States’ various regulatory agencies have made it clear that they do not believe that nano-specific regulations are necessary.

This belief may be based on an unwillingness or inability to delve into the scientific complexity inherent to nanotechnology.

Most regulations aim to prevent the misuse of non-reproductive nanoparticles and do not address the threat of self-replicating or self-assembling nanorobots.

Inadequate Alternate Theories for Regulating Weaponized Nanotechnology

Indeed, modern regulatory frameworks are likely insufficient to deal with any intentional deployment of nanotechnology in a wartime setting. The field of nanotechnology could produce weapons that “span several traditional technological compartments and blur the distinction between conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”

The current substitute for a true international framework regulates nanotechnology from the edges rather than addressing it head-on.

There is no current international treaty that regulates weaponized nanotechnology.

However, nanotechnology is evolving into a field increasingly distinct from the sciences that influence traditional weapons production. Because of this divergence, regulations on current weapons technologies likely will not accurately encompass future weaponized nanotechnology.

Pre-emptively developing a comprehensive international approach to intentionally weaponized nanotechnology is important because the technology’s deployment would likely be deliberately calculated to inflict maximum damage.

The amorphous nature of nanotechnology presents problems even beyond the classification of weapons as conventional or weapons of mass destruction.

One of the most prominent of these concerns is the ability of nanotechnology to alter body chemistry.

Nasu speculates that nanomedicine may be used on a country’s own soldiers in a future war to enhance their physical capabilities, but with significant long-term harm to the soldiers.

A regulatory regime must therefore encompass not only the acts of a rogue actor with access to nanotechnology and those of a state deploying nanotechnology against enemy combatants,

but also those of a state turning these technologies on its own citizens.

Current regimes of common law within the international community also will be insufficient to address concerns of evolving nanotechnology. These definitions largely center on the differences between the intent behind actions and the consequences of those same actions. In the case of some nanotechnology, this chasm could be far wider than with any other kind of weapons technology.

Further statutes hinge on the definition of “suffering,” which retains an amorphous definition in international law.

Beyond this amorphous definition, there is uncertainty as to whether weaponized nanotechnology would cause “unnecessary” and “superfluous” damage. If the damage were defined as such, then international common law would be implicated, but otherwise, there would be little recourse within the international common law.

Finally, preemptively shutting off the spigot of nanotechnology-based weapons may be nearly impossible without the catastrophe that Bowman & Hodge allude to because nations will be unwilling to submit to nanotechnology regulations that preemptively deter weapons development. The proscriptive measures currently available do not sufficiently deter states from weapon development given the powerful financial incentives favoring weapon development; asking states to submit to pre-emptive checks of nascent technology with great economic potential is quixotic at best.

Ineffectiveness of Purely National Solutions

The international nature of nanotechnology development presents unique problems for avoiding its weaponization. As previously mentioned, at least five militaries are aggressively pursuing nanotechnological advantages.

If the international community waits to enact these enforcements until nanotechnology is deployed in an international conflict, the consequences may be far worse for two reasons. First, the technology has shown enough destructive potential that an intentionally combative use of it could easily exceed the consequences of an industrial accident. Second, it would be difficult to regulate this technology during an actual conflict because of the incentives of war and the uncertainties of classifying nanotechnology.

IV. ANALYSIS

Because of the current state of regulation, it will be necessary to articulate and implement structures for regulating nanotechnology as a weapon and not just as a new research technology. Current weapons regulations are at best inadequate and contain too many contradictions and ambiguities to function effectively.

The International Criminal Court (ICC), while imperfect, is currently the best solution for such regulation.

The ICC already exists and would not require the adoption of a new set of international treaties. Its charter seeks to prevent acts of large-scale destruction and crimes against humanity. This large-scale frame of reference is appropriate because one of the more serious effects of weaponized biotech could be biological warfare. Additionally, the ICC can target both elected state actors and private but prominent actors within states for their crimes.

The current draft of the crime of aggression “distinguishes between the ‘act of aggression’ (what a state does) and the ‘crime of aggression’ (what a leader does).” This gap addresses the difference between an actual national act of aggression against another state and the planning, initiation, and execution of such an act by the country’s political leadership.

Aggression is a “leadership” crime, and charges can be brought not only against actual political leaders, but also those in a position to induce or influence significant policy changes within a state.

It is therefore more likely that influential scientists and technicians could be held to account for their influence in the development of nanoweapons.

This flexibility of the Court could also help weak governments confront private developers of military nanotechnology within their borders.

In addition, the crime of aggression could include a provision for attempted aggression, even though some scholars currently see this as unlikely.

The functional predecessors of the ICC also zealously prosecuted non-state actors for their complicity in human rights violations;

the Nuremburg prosecutions included actions against those who financed the Nazi regime on the theory that their actions had enabled the atrocities that followed.

CONCLUSION

Nanotechnology promises rapid advancement to many areas of science. In the next decades, it may dramatically improve surgical techniques, durability of goods, and industrial processes.

There are many reasons to embrace the development of the technology. However, the unknowns surrounding nanotechnology affirm that the embrace should be cautious.

Nanoparticles can have unpredictable and adverse effects on organisms, and nanorobots could deal a crippling blow to a nation or business’s technology infrastructure if they achieve the ability to replicate themselves.

Current methods of punishing the intentional misuse of nanotechnology are inadequate. The common law includes elements for war crimes that do not apply to nanotechnology. Nanoparticles do not closely enough resemble biological or chemical agents to fall under the Biological Weapons Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention. Current international treaties regarding delivery vehicles and other traditional weapons will not capture the future evolution of nanotech. And nations cannot be relied upon to regulate their own military technology in a time of war. The International Criminal Court already exists. It has prosecutors, and it has a defined power structure. The ICC has prosecuted crimes across the globe, so its reach is not in question. The ICC is designed to account for actions that affect broad swaths of people like researchers speculate an advanced nanoweapon would. Finally, the Special Working Group is still defining the crime of aggression, so definitions specifically condemning the evils of weaponized nanotech could be plugged relatively seamlessly into the broad Rome Statute framework. Before the military conflicts of the upcoming years and decades, nations should unequivocally state that nanotechnology has no place as a weapon.

Its potential effects invoke our deepest fears.

Properly weaponized, it could kill numbers of people that society currently believes only weapons of mass destruction can.

The international community should demonstrate the international criminal consequences that will accompany the deployment of such a technology. The ICC is the best option for accomplishing such regulation and deterrence.

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Justice is only possible when lawyers practice their professions in accordance with the rule of law.

THE USE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AS A WEAPON IS A DELIBERATE CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY